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Secure Degrees of Freedom of Multi-user Networks:
One-Time-Pads in the Air via Alignment
Jianwei Xie, and Sennur Ulukus, Member, IEEE
Abstract—We revisit the recent secure degrees of freedom
(s.d.o.f.) results for one-hop multi-user wireless networks by con-
sidering three fundamental wireless network structures: Gaussian
wiretap channel with helpers, Gaussian multiple access wiretap
channel, and Gaussian interference channel with secrecy con-
straints. We present main enabling tools and resulting communi-
cation schemes in an expository manner, along with key insights
and design principles emerging from them. The main achievable
schemes are based on real interference alignment, channel
prefixing via cooperative jamming, and structured signalling.
Real interference alignment enables aligning the cooperative
jamming signals together with the message carrying signals at the
eavesdroppers to protect them akin to one-time-pad protecting
messages in wired systems. Real interference alignment also
enables decodability at the legitimate receivers by rendering
message carrying and cooperative jamming signals separable,
and simultaneously aligning the cooperative jamming signals in
the smallest possible sub-space. The main converse techniques
are based on two key lemmas which quantify the secrecy penalty
by showing that the net effect of an eavesdropper on the system
is that it eliminates one of the independent channel inputs; and
the role of a helper by developing a direct relationship between
the cooperative jamming signal of a helper and the message
rate. These two lemmas when applied according to the unique
structure of individual networks provide tight converses. Finally,
we present a blind cooperative jamming scheme for the helper
network with no eavesdropper channel state information at the
transmitters that achieves the same optimal s.d.o.f. as in the case
of full eavesdropper channel state information.
Index Terms—Wiretap channel, multiple access channel, inter-
ference channel, secure degrees of freedom, cooperative jamming,
interference alignment.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider several fundamental multi-user network struc-
tures under secrecy constraints: Gaussian wiretap channel with
M helpers, K-user Gaussian multiple access wiretap chan-
nel and K-user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy
constraints. Security of communication was first considered
by Shannon in [1], where a legitimate pair wishes to have
secure communication in the presence of an eavesdropper over
a noiseless channel, leading to the necessity of secure keys and
the one-time-pad encryption method, in that model. Wyner
introduced the noisy wiretap channel, and demonstrated that
secure communication can be attained by stochastic encoding
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Fig. 1. Gaussian wiretap channel with one helper.
without using any keys, if the eavesdropper is degraded with
respect to the legitimate receiver [2]. Csiszar and Korner
generalized his result to arbitrary, not necessarily degraded,
wiretap channels, and showed that secure communication is
still possible, even when the eavesdropper is not degraded [3].
Csiszar and Korner introduced channel prefixing and rate split-
ting into the achievable scheme in addition to Wyner’s stochas-
tic encoding. Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman obtained the
capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian wiretap channel
[4], which is degraded.
This line of research has been subsequently extended to
many multi-user settings, e.g., broadcast channels with con-
fidential messages [5]–[10], multi-receiver wiretap channels
[11]–[15], interference channels with confidential messages
and/or external eavesdroppers [5], [16]–[18], multiple access
wiretap channels [19]–[23], relay eavesdropper channels [24]–
[27], untrusted relay channels [28], [29], two-way wiretap
channels [20], [30]–[32], multi-way relay wiretap channels
[33], compound wiretap channels [34], [35], etc. For many
of these networks, even in simple Gaussian settings, exact
secrecy capacity regions are still unknown. Here, we focus
on Gaussian wiretap channel with helpers, Gaussian multiple
access wiretap channel and Gaussian interference channel with
secrecy constraints, for all of which, the exact secrecy capacity
regions are unknown. In the absence of exact secrecy capacity
regions, achievable secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) at
high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regimes has been studied in
the literature [36]–[58]. In this paper, we revisit the results,
insights, and main tools presented in a sequence of papers in
[46]–[54], which determined the exact s.d.o.f. regions of all
of these three classes of networks.
In the canonical Gaussian wiretap channel, Gaussian sig-
nalling is optimal, and the secrecy capacity is the differ-
ence of the channel capacities of the transmitter-receiver and
the transmitter-eavesdropper pairs [4]. It is well-known that
this difference does not scale with the SNR, and hence the
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Fig. 2. Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers.
s.d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap channel is zero, indicating a
severe penalty due to secrecy in this case. If there is a helper
in the system, as shown in Fig. 1, the helper can improve
the achievable secrecy rate of the main transmitter by sending
cooperative jamming signals [19], [20]. The secrecy capacity
of a wiretap channel with a helper, and the optimal helping
strategy are unknown. However, it is known that the s.d.o.f. of
this system with independent identically distributed (i.i.d.)
Gaussian cooperative jamming signals is still zero [42], [59].
In addition, in earlier work, it is observed that strictly positive
s.d.o.f. can be obtained, for instance, by using structured codes
[39], [40] or by using non-i.i.d. Gaussian signalling [42].
References [46], [48] determined the exact optimal s.d.o.f. of
a wiretap channel with an arbitrary number of (M ) helpers,
see Fig. 2, and also the optimal helper signalling in the sense
of achieving the largest s.d.o.f. The emerging idea in [46],
[48] for optimal s.d.o.f. is that the cooperation signals should
not have too much randomness (hence the sub-optimality of
i.i.d. Gaussian signalling), as they hurt both the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper. Therefore, weaker cooperative
jamming signals are needed, and that the received sub-spaces
at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper need to be
carefully controlled.
The achievable scheme in [46], [48] is based on real
interference alignment [60], [61] and cooperative jamming
[20], and is as follows: The legitimate receiver divides its
message into M parts, where M is the number of helpers.
Each one of M helpers sends a cooperative jamming signal.
All signals, both message carrying and cooperative jamming
signals, come from structured pulse amplitude modulation
(PAM) constellations. Each one of the cooperative jamming
signals is aligned with a message carrying signal at the
eavesdropper; see Fig. 5. This action protects the message by
limiting the information leakage to the eavesdropper. This is
akin to one-time-pad in wired systems [1]. In one-time-pad,
when a uniformly distributed message signal W is XORed
with an independent and uniformly distributed key K , the
overall signal X = W ⊕K becomes statistically independent
of the message, i.e., I(X ;W ) = 0, i.e., information leakage
to the eavesdropper is exactly zero. With real interference
alignment and uniform PAM signals, we show that the mutual
information between the messages and the eavesdropper’s
observation is not exactly zero, but is upper bounded by
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Fig. 3. K-user multiple access wiretap channel.
a constant, and therefore, is effectively zero in terms of
s.d.o.f. At the same time, all of the cooperative jamming
signals are aligned in the smallest sub-space at the legitimate
receiver, and are separated from the message carrying signals,
see Fig. 5, in order to allow for the largest sub-space for the
useful signals and enable their decodability. The details of
the performance analysis in terms of rate and equivocation
achieved by this scheme is based on the Khintchine-Groshev
theorem of Diophantine approximation in number theory.
The converse developed in [46], [48] for this channel model
has two key steps. First, the secrecy rate is upper bounded
by the difference of the sum of differential entropies of the
channel inputs of the legitimate receiver and the helpers and
the differential entropy of the eavesdropper’s observation. Due
to the eavesdropper’s observation, one of the independent
channel inputs is eliminated, and that is why this fact is
named the secrecy penalty lemma. In the second step, a direct
relationship is developed between the cooperative jamming
signal from an independent helper and the message rate. The
motivation of this step, which is named, role of a helper
lemma, is to determine the optimum action (role) of a helper:
If the legitimate user is to reliably decode the message signal
which is mixed with the cooperative jamming signal, there
must exist a constraint on the cooperative jamming signal.
This lemma identifies this constraint by developing an upper
bound on the differential entropy of the cooperative jamming
signal coming from a helper in terms of the message rate. By
using these two lemmas, and the achievable scheme described
above, [46], [48] determine the exact s.d.o.f. of the Gaussian
wiretap channel with M helpers to be M
M+1 .
For the case of K-user multiple access wiretap channel, see
Fig 3, where all K users have messages to be hidden from
an external eavesdropper, [47], [48] show that, the exact sum
s.d.o.f. is K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 . Note that this is larger than one user
utilizing the remaining K − 1 users as helpers, which gives
a s.d.o.f. of K−1
K
, and time-sharing between such strategies
among all users. Therefore, the fact that all users in the
system have messages enables the system as a whole to
obtain a higher sum s.d.o.f. The converse in this case is by
extending the secrecy penalty and role of a helper lemmas to a
multi-message setting. The achievability is by real interference
alignment, channel prefixing by cooperative jamming, and
3Z (if there is any)
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Fig. 4. K-user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints.
structured signalling. Specifically, each transmitter divides its
message into K − 1 sub-messages, and sends these messages
together with a cooperative jamming signal; see Fig 6. All of
the signals come from the same structured PAM constellation.
Each cooperative jamming signal is aligned with K − 1
message carrying signals at the eavesdropper, protecting all
of them simultaneously. At the same time, all of the K
cooperative jamming signals are aligned in the smallest sub-
space at the legitimate receiver. Different from the helper
setting, here all transmitters send a mix of message carrying
signals and cooperative jamming signals. This is an instance
of channel prefixing [3] where the actual channel input is a
further randomization of the message carrying signal.
For the case of K-user interference channel with secrecy
constraints, [49], [50] consider the cases of confidential mes-
sages where each transmitter’s message is to be kept secret
from the K − 1 legitimate receivers, external eavesdropper
where all transmitters’ messages are to be kept secret from an
external eavesdropper, and the combination of the two where
all messages are to be kept secret from K receivers one of
which is the external eavesdropper, and show that, for all of
these three cases, the exact sum s.d.o.f. is K(K−1)2K−1 . Since each
message is needed to be kept secret from multiple receivers,
the bounding techniques in [48] are extended in [49], [50]
to be valid for the interference channel setting, by focusing
on the eavesdroppers as opposed to the messages, and then
by sequentially applying the role of a helper lemma to each
transmitter by treating its signal as a helper to another specific
transmitter. For achievability, for the K = 2 user interference
channel with confidential messages case, since each message
needs to be aligned at only two receivers, [48] develops a real
alignment and cooperative jamming based scheme as in the
cases of helper and multiple access networks. However, for the
general K-user case, each message needs to be delivered to a
receiver and protected from K other receivers, which requires
careful simultaneous alignment at K+1 receivers. References
[49], [50] achieve this alignment by using an asymptotical
real interference alignment technique [61], where many signals
are introduced to carry each message, and they are aligned
simultaneously at multiple receivers only order-wise (i.e., we
align most of them, but not all of them), and by developing
a method to upper bound the information leakage rate by a
function which can be made small.
While [47]–[50] determine the sum s.d.o.f. of multiple
access and interference channels with secrecy constraints,
references [51]–[53] establish the entire s.d.o.f. regions. Such
regions show the trade-offs between the achievable s.d.o.f. of
individual users. In order to determine the s.d.o.f. regions,
asymmetric (not only sum) s.d.o.f. expressions are developed.
In addition, in the case of interference channels, constraints
due to interference also, in addition to secrecy, are needed
in the final region expressions. For achievability, [51]–[53]
observe that the converse regions have a polytope structure,
and develop achievable schemes that achieve the extreme
points of the polytope region. The major effort in [51]–[53]
is to efficiently enumerate all of the extreme points of the
converse region, and then to develop an achievable scheme
for each extreme point of this region; the achievability of the
entire region then follows from time-sharing.
A crucial property of all of the scenarios considered so
far is that the transmitters have full channel state information
(CSI) of all channels in the system. In fact, these CSI are
carefully utilized in the corresponding alignment schemes.
Reference [54] considers a practically relevant scenario, where
in a wiretap channel with helpers, the transmitters have CSI
only to the legitimate receiver, but no CSI to the eavesdropper.
Reference [54] shows the surprising result that, in this helper
network, even without any eavesdropper CSI, the optimal
s.d.o.f. of M
M+1 can be achieved. The converse to this result
follows from the converse for the case of full CSI in [46], [48].
The achievability is by a blind alignment scheme inspired by
[56]. In the scheme proposed in [54], all helpers as well as
the legitimate transmitter send cooperative jamming signals;
see Fig. 11 and compare it with Fig. 5. In this system, there
are a total of M +1 cooperative jamming signals which span
the decoding space of the eavesdropper and hence protect the
M message carrying signals. Note that, exact alignment at the
eavesdropper is not possible, as eavesdropper CSI is unknown
at the transmitters. In this setting, a different technique is used
to prove that the information leakage to the eavesdropper is
upper bounded. In addition, here, the CSI to the legitimate
receiver is used to align all of the M+1 cooperative jamming
signals in the smallest sub-space at the legitimate receiver1.
II. MAIN TOOLS
In this section, we review main tools used in this paper. The
converse tools include two lemmas: Lemma 1, which is the
secrecy penalty lemma, and Lemma 2, which is the role of a
helper lemma. The achievability tool is the technique of real
interference alignment, which is stated in Lemma 3.
A. Converse Tools: Secrecy Penalty and Role of a Helper
Lemmas
In the following lemma (Lemma 1), we give a general upper
bound for the secrecy rate. This lemma is first motivated by,
and stated for, the Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers
(see Fig. 2), which is defined by,
Y1 = h1X1 +
M+1∑
j=2
hjXj +N1 (1)
1Very recently, the multiple access channel [62] and the interference channel
with an external eavesdropper [63] have been considered for the case of no
eavesdropper CSI at the transmitters.
4Y2 = g1X1 +
M+1∑
j=2
gjXj +N2 (2)
where Y1 is the channel output of the legitimate receiver, Y2 is
the channel output of the eavesdropper,X1 is the channel input
of the legitimate transmitter, Xi, for i = 2, . . . ,M +1, are the
channel inputs of the M helpers, hi is the channel gain of
the ith transmitter to the legitimate receiver, gi is the channel
gain of the ith transmitter to the eavesdropper, and N1 and N2
are two independent zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian random
variables. All channel inputs satisfy average power constraints,
E
[
X2i
]
≤ P , for i = 1, . . . ,M + 1. Transmitter 1 intends to
send a message W to the legitimate receiver (receiver 1). The
rate of the message is R △= 1
n
log |W|, where n is the number
of channel uses. A secrecy rate R is said to be achievable if
for any ǫ > 0 there exists an n-length code such that receiver
1 can decode this message reliably, and the message is kept
information-theoretically secure against the eavesdropper,
1
n
H(W |Y2) ≥
1
n
H(W )− ǫ (3)
i.e., that the uncertainty of the message W , given the obser-
vation Y2 of the eavesdropper, is almost equal to the entropy
of the message. This is equivalent to,
1
n
I(W ;Y2) ≤ ǫ (4)
i.e., the (normalized) information leakage to the eavesdropper
asymptotically vanishes, resulting in perfect (weak) secrecy
[3]. The supremum of all achievable secrecy rates is the
secrecy capacity Cs, and the s.d.o.f., Ds, is defined as
Ds
△
= lim
P→∞
Cs
1
2 logP
(5)
The s.d.o.f. determines the scaling of the secrecy capacity
with the capacity of a single-user channel which is 12 logP at
high SNR. That is, s.d.o.f. is the pre-log factor of the secrecy
capacity at high SNR.
The goal of Lemma 1 is to quantify the secrecy penalty
due to the presence of an eavesdropper. We work with n-letter
signals (hence bold vectors) and introduce small independent
Gaussian fudge variables N˜i and state inequalities in terms
of slightly perturbed channel inputs X˜i; this is for regularity
purposes only, so that we can use differential entropies even
for discrete signals throughout the paper.
This lemma states that the secrecy rate of the legitimate pair
is upper bounded by the difference of the sum of differential
entropies of all channel inputs (perturbed by small noise) and
the differential entropy of the eavesdropper’s observation; see
(6). This upper bound can be interpreted as follows: If we
consider the eavesdropper’s observation as the secrecy penalty,
then the secrecy penalty is tantamount to the elimination of
one of the channel inputs in the system; see (7).
Lemma 1 ([46], [48]) [Secrecy penalty lemma] The secrecy
rate of the legitimate pair is upper bounded as
nR ≤
M+1∑
i=1
h(X˜i)− h(Y2) + nc (6)
≤
M+1∑
i=1,i6=j
h(X˜i) + nc
′ (7)
where X˜i = Xi + N˜i for i = 1, 2, · · · ,M + 1, and N˜i is
an i.i.d. sequence (in time) of random variables N˜i which
are independent Gaussian random variables with zero-mean
and variance σ˜2i with σ˜2i < min(1/h2i , 1/g2i ). In addition, c
and c′ are constants which do not depend on P , and j ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,M + 1} could be arbitrary.
In the following lemma (Lemma 2), we give a general upper
bound for the differential entropy of the signal of a helper
based on the decodability of the message of the legitimate
transmitter at the legitimate receiver. This lemma is also
motivated in the helper setting, but as with Lemma 1 above,
it is valid for more general settings. The goal of this lemma
is to quantify the role of a helper, in terms of its affect on
the system. In this lemma, W is the message of the legitimate
transmitter, and its entropy H(W ) is the message rate. Here,
Xj is the jth helper’s channel input, and Y1 is the legitimate
receiver’s channel output. Again, we use slightly perturbed
channel inputs for regularity.
This lemma is motivated as follows: A cooperative jamming
signal from a helper may potentially increase the secrecy of
the legitimate transmitter-receiver pair by creating extra equiv-
ocation at the eavesdropper. However, if the helper creates too
much equivocation, it may also hurt the decoding performance
of the legitimate receiver. Since the legitimate receiver needs
to decode message W by observing Y1, there must exist a
constraint on the cooperative jamming signal of the helper, Xj .
This lemma develops a constraint on the differential entropy of
(the noisy version of) the cooperative jamming signal of any
given helper, helper j in (8), in terms of the differential entropy
of the legitimate user’s channel output and the message rate
H(W ). The inequality in (8) states that, for a given message
rate H(W ), the entropy of the signal that the helper puts into
the channel should not be too much. Alternatively, H(W ) can
be moved to the left hand side of (8), and this inequality
can be interpreted as an upper on the message rate given the
helper signal’s entropy. In particular, the higher the differential
entropy of the cooperative jamming signal the lower this upper
bound on the message rate will be. This motivates us not to
use i.i.d. Gaussian cooperative jamming signals which have
the highest differential entropy.
Lemma 2 ([46], [48]) [Role of a helper lemma] For reliable
decoding at the legitimate receiver, the differential entropy of
the input signal of helper j, Xj , must satisfy
h(Xj + N˜) ≤ h(Y1)−H(W ) + nc (8)
where c is a constant which does not depend on P , and N˜ is a
new Gaussian noise independent of all other random variables
with σ2
N˜
< 1
h2j
, and N˜ is an i.i.d. sequence of N˜ .
B. Achievability Tools: Real Interference Alignment
In this subsection, we review pulse amplitude modulation
(PAM) and real interference alignment [60], [61], similar to
5the review in [45, Section III]. The purpose of this subsection
is to illustrate that by using real interference alignment, the
transmission rate of a PAM scheme can be made to approach
the Shannon achievable rate at high SNR. This provides a
universal and convenient way to design capacity-achieving
signalling schemes at high SNR by using PAM for different
channel models as will be done in later sections.
For a point-to-point scalar Gaussian channel,
Y = X + Z (9)
with additive Gaussian noise Z of zero-mean and variance σ2,
and an input power constraint E
[
X2
]
≤ P , assume that the
input symbols are drawn from a PAM constellation,
C(a,Q) = a {−Q,−Q+ 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (10)
where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number to
normalize the transmit power. Note that, a is also the min-
imum distance dmin(C) of this constellation, which has the
probability of error
Pr(e) = Pr
[
X 6= Xˆ
]
≤ exp
(
−
d2min
8σ2
)
= exp
(
−
a2
8σ2
)
(11)
where Xˆ is an estimate for X obtained by choosing the closest
point in the constellation C(a,Q) based on observation Y .
This PAM scheme for the point-to-point scalar channel can
be generalized to multiple data streams. Let the transmit signal
be
x = aTb =
L∑
i=1
aibi (12)
where a1, . . . , aL are rationally independent real numbers2 and
each bi is drawn independently from the constellation C(a,Q)
in (10). The real value x is a combination of L data streams,
and the constellation observed at the receiver consists of (2Q+
1)L signal points.
By using the Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine
approximation in number theory, [60], [61] bounded the min-
imum distance dmin of points in the receiver’s constellation:
For any δ > 0, there exists a constant kδ, such that
dmin ≥
kδa
QL−1+δ
(13)
for almost all rationally independent {ai}Li=1, except for a set
of Lebesgue measure zero. Since the minimum distance of the
receiver constellation is lower bounded, with proper choice of
a and Q, the probability of error can be made arbitrarily small,
with rate R approaching 12 logP . This result is stated in the
following lemma, as in [45, Proposition 3].
Lemma 3 ([60], [61]) [Real interference alignment] For any
small enough δ > 0, there exists a positive constant γ, which
is independent of P , such that if we choose
Q = P
1−δ
2(L+δ) and a = γ P
1
2
Q
(14)
2 a1, . . . , aL are rationally independent if whenever q1, . . . , qL are rational
numbers then
∑
L
i=1
qiai = 0 implies qi = 0 for all i.
then the average power constraint is satisfied, i.e., E [X2] ≤
P , and for almost all {ai}Li=1, except for a set of Lebesgue
measure zero, the probability of error is bounded by
Pr(e) ≤ exp
(
−ηγP
δ
) (15)
where ηγ is a positive constant which is independent of P .
III. WIRETAP CHANNELS WITH M HELPERS
In this section, we consider the Gaussian wiretap channel
with M helpers shown in Fig. 2 and defined in (1) and (2).
In the sequel, we will demonstrate the use of converse and
achievability lemmas presented in Section II in some depth
in the context of a helper network; we will then make much
briefer presentations for the multiple access and interference
networks in the following sections.
Here, we show that for the wiretap channel with M helpers,
the exact s.d.o.f. is M
M+1 , as stated in the following theorem.
This shows that even though the helpers are independent, the
s.d.o.f. increases monotonically with the number of helpers M ,
and goes to 1, which is the d.o.f. with no secrecy constraints.
Theorem 1 ([46], [48]) The s.d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap
channel with M helpers is M
M+1 for almost all channel gains.
A. Converse
We start with (7) of Lemma 1 with the selection of j = 1
nR ≤
M+1∑
i=1,i6=j
h(X˜i) + nc
′ (16)
=
M+1∑
i=2
h(X˜i) + nc
′ (17)
≤M [h(Y1)−H(W )] + nc1 (18)
where (18) is due to Lemma 2 for each cooperative jamming
signal X˜i, i = 2, · · · ,M + 1. By noting H(W ) = nR, (18)
implies that
(M + 1)nR ≤Mh(Y1) + nc1 (19)
≤M
(n
2
logP
)
+ nc2 (20)
which further implies that
Ds ≤
M
M + 1
(21)
which concludes the converse part of the theorem.
B. Achievable Scheme
Let {V2, V3, · · · , VM+1, U2, U3, · · · , UM+1} be mutually
independent discrete random variables, each of which uni-
formly drawn from the same PAM constellation C(a,Q) in
(10), where a and Q will be specified later. We choose the
input signal of the legitimate transmitter as
X1 =
M+1∑
k=2
gk
g1hk
Vk (22)
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Fig. 5. Illustration of interference alignment for the Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers. Here, M = 2.
and the input signal of the jth helper, j = 2, · · · ,M + 1, as
Xj =
1
hj
Uj (23)
Then, the observations of the receivers are
Y1 =
M+1∑
k=2
h1gk
g1hk
Vk +

M+1∑
j=2
Uj

+N1 (24)
Y2 =
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
[
Vk + Uk
]
+N2 (25)
The intuition here is as follows: We use M independent
sub-signals Vk, k = 2, · · · ,M + 1, to represent the sig-
nals carrying the original message W . The input signal X1
is a linear combination of Vks. To cooperatively jam the
eavesdropper, each helper k aligns the cooperative jamming
signal Uk in the same dimension as the sub-signal Vk at the
eavesdropper. At the legitimate receiver, all of the cooperative
jamming signals Uks are well-aligned such that they occupy
a small portion of the signal space. Since, with probability
one,
{
1, h1g2
g1h2
, h1g3
g1h3
, · · · , h1gM+1
g1hM+1
}
are rationally independent,
signals
{
V2, V3, · · · , VM+1,
∑M+1
j=2 Uj
}
can be distinguished
by the legitimate receiver. Square parentheses in (24) and (25)
indicate alignments at the two receivers. As an example, the
case of M = 2 is shown in Fig. 5.
The exact performance analysis supporting the above intu-
ition is based on real interference alignment summarized in
Lemma 3, and the achievable secrecy rate in [3]. In particular,
since, for each j 6= 1, Xj is an i.i.d. sequence and independent
of X1, the following secrecy rate is achievable [3]
Cs ≥ I(X1;Y1)− I(X1;Y2) (26)
Now, we first bound the probability of decoding error.
Note that the space observed at receiver 1 consists of (2Q +
1)M (2MQ+1) points in M+1 dimensions, and the sub-signal
in each dimension is drawn from a constellation of C(a,MQ).
Here, we use the property that C(a,Q) ⊂ C(a,MQ). By
Lemma 3, for any small enough δ > 0 and for almost all
rationally independent
{
1, h1g2
g1h2
, h1g3
g1h3
, · · · , h1gM+1
g1hM+1
}
, except
for a set of Lebesgue measure zero, there exists a positive
constant γ, which is independent of P , such that if we choose
Q = P
1−δ
2(M+1+δ) and a = γP 12 /Q then the average power
constraint is satisfied and the probability of error is bounded
as
Pr
[
X1 6= Xˆ1
]
≤ exp
(
−ηγP
δ
) (27)
where ηγ is a positive constant which is independent of P and
where Xˆ1 is the estimate of X1 by choosing the closest point
in the constellation based on observation Y1. This shows that
the legitimate receiver can decode the messages reliably.
By Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain X1 → Y1 →
Xˆ1, we know that
H(X1|Y1) ≤ H(X1|Xˆ1) (28)
≤ 1 + exp
(
−ηγP
δ
)
log(2Q+ 1)M (29)
which means that
I(X1;Y1) = H(X1)−H(X1|Y1) (30)
≥
[
1− exp
(
ηγP
δ
)]
log(2Q+ 1)M − 1 (31)
On the other hand,
I(X1;Y2) ≤ I
(
X1;
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
(Vk + Uk)
)
(32)
= H
(
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
(Vk + Uk)
)
−H
(
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
(Vk + Uk)
∣∣∣X1
)
(33)
= H
(
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
(Vk + Uk)
)
−H
(
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
Uk
)
(34)
≤ log(4Q+ 1)M − log(2Q+ 1)M (35)
≤M log
4Q+ 1
2Q+ 1
(36)
≤M (37)
where (35) is due to the fact that entropy of the sum∑M+1
k=2
gk
hk
(Vk+Uk) is maximized by the uniform distribution
which takes values over a set of cardinality (4Q+ 1)M .
Combining (31) and (37), from (26), we have
Cs ≥ I(X1;Y1)− I(X1;Y2) (38)
≥
[
1− exp
(
−ηγP
δ
)]
log(2Q+ 1)M − (M + 1) (39)
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[
1− exp
(
−ηγP
δ
)]
log(2P
1−δ
2(M+1+δ) + 1)M − (M + 1)
(40)
=
M(1− δ)
(M + 1 + δ)
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (41)
where o(·) is the little-o function. If we choose δ arbitrarily
small, then we can achieve M
M+1 s.d.o.f., which concludes the
achievability part of the theorem.
IV. MULTIPLE ACCESS WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we consider the K-user multiple access wire-
tap channel shown in Fig. 3, which has multiple transmitters
each with its own message to transmit:
Y1 =
K∑
i=1
hiXi +N1 (42)
Y2 =
K∑
i=1
giXi +N2 (43)
We show that the exact sum s.d.o.f. of this channel is
K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 , as stated in the following theorem. Note that this
is strictly larger than the s.d.o.f. of the corresponding helper
network, which is K−1
K
.
Theorem 2 ([47], [48]) The sum s.d.o.f. of the K-user Gaus-
sian multiple access wiretap channel is K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 for almost
all channel gains.
The converse is derived by starting with an upper bound
which is similar to the secrecy penalty lemma in Lemma 1,
and considering all transmitters as a single virtual transmitter:
n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤
K∑
i=1
h(X˜i)− h(Y2) + nc3 (44)
≤
K∑
i=2
h(X˜i) + nc4 (45)
In addition, similar to the role of a helper lemma in Lemma 2,
we bound the differential entropy of each user’s channel input
with the sum of the decodable rates of all other users:∑
i6=j
H(Wi) = H(W6=j) ≤ h(Y1)− h(X˜j) + nc5 (46)
The converse is completed by proceeding similarly to the case
of the helper network, starting from the above generalizations
of Lemmas 1 and 2.
The achievable scheme is as follows: Each transmitter i
divides its message into K − 1 mutually independent sub-
signals. In addition, each transmitter i sends a cooperative
jamming signal Ui. This is an instance of channel prefixing
[3], where the channel input is further randomized. At the
eavesdropper Y2, each sub-signal indexed by (i, j), where
j ∈ {1, · · · ,K}\{i}, is aligned with a cooperative jamming
signal Ui. At the legitimate receiver Y1, all of the cooperative
jamming signals are aligned in the same dimension to occupy
as small a signal space as possible. This scheme is illustrated
in Fig. 6 for the case of K = 3.
V3
U1
U1 U2 U3
U2
U3
V1
V2
X1
X2
Y1
Y2
X3
V1
U2
V2
U3
V3
V1 V2 V3
U1
Fig. 6. Illustration of interference alignment for the K-user multiple access
wiretap channel. Here, K = 3.
Specifically, we use in total K2 mutually independent
random variables which are
Vi,j , i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}, j 6= i (47)
Uk, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K} (48)
where Vi,j , j 6= i are the K − 1 sub-signals that carry the
message of user i, and Ui is the cooperative jamming signal
sent by user i. All of these random variables are uniformly and
independently drawn from the same constellation C(a,Q) in
(10). For each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}, we choose the input signal
of transmitter i as
Xi =
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
gj
gihj
Vi,j +
1
hi
Ui (49)
With these input signal selections, received signals are
Y1 =
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
gjhi
gihj
Vi,j +
[
K∑
k=1
Uk
]
+N1 (50)
Y2 =

 K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
gj
hj
Vi,j

+ K∑
j=1
gj
hj
Uj +N2 (51)
=
K∑
j=1
gj
hj

Uj + K∑
i=1,i6=j
Vi,j

+N2 (52)
Each of the signals in the square parentheses in (50) and (52)
are aligned in the same irrational dimension. This alignment
in (50) ensures that the cooperative jamming signals occupy
the smallest possible space at the legitimate receiver, and the
alignment in (52) ensures that each Uj protects all the Vi,js
in the same square parentheses.
V. INTERFERENCE CHANNEL WITH SECRECY
In this section, we consider the K-user Gaussian interfer-
ence channel with secrecy constraints shown in Fig. 4. The
channel model is:
Yi =
K∑
j=1
hjiXj +Ni, i = 1, . . . ,K (53)
Z =
K∑
j=1
gjXj +NZ (if there is any) (54)
8which has not only multiple transmitters but also multiple
receivers in the network. We consider three different secrecy
requirements: interference channel with an external eaves-
dropper (IC-EE), where all of the messages are kept secure
against the external eavesdropper; interference channel with
confidential messages (IC-CM), where all messages are kept
secure against unintended receivers; and their combination
(IC-CM-EE), where all messages are kept secure against all
unintended receivers and the eavesdropper. The sum s.d.o.f. is
the same for all three networks and is stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3 ([49], [50]) The sum s.d.o.f. of the K-user IC-
EE, IC-CM, and IC-CM-EE is K(K−1)2K−1 for almost all channel
gains.
We provide an outline of the converse and achievable
scheme for IC-EE only here. The converse starts with
Lemma 1, the secrecy penalty lemma: For any j = 1, . . . ,K ,
n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ h(X˜
K
1 )− h(Z) + nc3 (55)
≤
K∑
i=1
h(X˜i)− h(Z) + nc3 (56)
≤
K∑
i=1,i6=j
h(X˜i) + nc6 (57)
Then, we apply the role of a helper lemma, Lemma 2, to each
X˜i with k = i+ 1 (for i = K , k = 1), in (57) as
n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ h(X˜1) + h(X˜2) + · · ·+ h(X˜j−1)
+ h(X˜j+1) + · · ·+ h(X˜K) + nc7 (58)
≤ [h(Y2)− nR2] + [h(Y3)− nR3] + · · ·
+ [h(Yj)− nRj ] + [h(Yj+2)− nRj+2] + · · ·
+ [h(YK)− nRK ] + [h(Y1)− nR1] + nc8
(59)
By noting that h(Yi) ≤ n2 logP + nc
′
i for each i, we have
2n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ (K − 1)
(n
2
logP
)
+ nR(j+1) mod K + nc9
(60)
for j = 1, . . . ,K . Therefore, we have a total of K bounds in
(60) for j = 1, . . . ,K . Summing these K bounds, we obtain:
(2K − 1)n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ K(K − 1)
(n
2
logP
)
+ nc10 (61)
which gives
Ds,Σ ≤
K(K − 1)
2K − 1
(62)
completing the converse for IC-EE.
The achievability is based on Lemma 3 for the K-user IC-
CM-EE, which will imply achievability for K-user IC-EE. We
V23
U1
V31V32
V23
V31 V32
V12V13
Y1 V12V13
U1V13
X1
X2 Y2
X3
U2
U3
Y3
Z
U1
U2
U3
U1
U2
U3V31V32
V23U2
U3
U1
V32 V31
V12V13
U3
U2
V31V32
V12
V23
V12V13
V23V21
V21
V21
V21
V21
Fig. 7. Illustration of alignment for 3-user IC-CM-EE. U1 and V21 are
marked to emphasize their simultaneous alignment at Y1, Y3 and Z .
employ a total of K2 random variables,
Vij , i, j = 1, . . . ,K, j 6= i (63)
Uk, k = 1, . . . ,K (64)
which are illustrated in Fig. 7 for the case of K = 3.
For transmitter i, K − 1 random variables {Vij}j 6=i, each
representing a sub-message, collectively carry message Wi.
Different than before, rather than protecting one message at
one receiver, each Uk simultaneously protects a portion of all
sub-messages at all required receivers. More specifically, Uk
protects {Vik}i6=k,i6=j at receivers j, and at the eavesdropper (if
there is any). For example, in Fig. 7, U1 protects V21 and V31
where necessary. In particular, U1 protects V21 at receivers 1, 3
and the eavesdropper; and it protects V31 at receivers 1, 2 and
the eavesdropper. As a technical challenge, this requires U1 to
be aligned with the same signal, say V21, at multiple receivers
simultaneously, i.e., at receivers 1, 3 and the eavesdropper.
These particular alignments are circled by ellipsoids in Fig. 7.
We do these simultaneous alignments using asymptotic real
alignment technique proposed in [61] and used in [38], [45].
VI. S.D.O.F. REGIONS OF WIRELESS NETWORKS
In this section, we revisit the K-user multiple access wiretap
channel in Section IV and K-user interference channel in
Section V, and study the s.d.o.f. regions of both networks. The
results have been characterized in the following theorems.
Theorem 4 ([51], [53]) The s.d.o.f. region D of the K-user
multiple access wiretap channel is the set of all d satisfying
Kdi + (K − 1)
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
dj ≤ K − 1, i = 1, . . . ,K (65)
di ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,K (66)
for almost all channel gains.
9Theorem 5 ([52], [53]) The s.d.o.f. region D of K-user IC-
EE, IC-CM, and IC-CM-EE is the set of all d satisfying
Kdi +
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
dj ≤ K − 1, i = 1, . . . ,K (67)
∑
i∈V
di ≤ 1, ∀ V ⊆ {1, . . . ,K}, |V | = 2 (68)
di ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,K (69)
for almost all channel gains.
The complete proofs can be found in [51]–[53]. The major
challenge in the proofs of both theorems is to show the
tightness of the converse regions. We first note that the
converse regions have polytope structures. This is because:
A set P ⊆ Rn is a polyhedron if there is a system of finitely
many inequalities Hx ≤ h such that,
P =
{
x ∈ Rn | Hx ≤ h
} (70)
Further, if P is a bounded polyhedron, then it is a polytope,
which is the case for the converse regions we derive. Due to
the Minkowski theorem below, the converse regions are equal
to the convex hull of their corresponding extreme points.
Theorem 6 (Minkowski, 1910. [64, Theorem 2.4.5]) Let
P ⊆ Rn be a compact convex set. Then,
P = Co(Ex(P )). (71)
Minkowski theorem plays an important role in this problem,
since it tells that, instead of studying the polytope P itself, for
this problem, i.e., achievability proofs, we can simply con-
centrate on all extreme points Ex(P ). The following theorem
helps us find all extreme points of a polytope P efficiently:
We select any n linearly independent active/tight boundaries
and check whether they give a point in the polytope P .
Theorem 7 ([65, Theorem 7.2(b)]) x ∈ Rn is an extreme
point of polyhedron P (H,h) if and only if Hx ≤ h and
H
′
x = h′ for some n× (n+1) sub-matrix (H′,h′) of (H,h)
with rank(H′) = n.
As shown by the proof in [53], the s.d.o.f. region of the
multiple access wiretap channel is constrained by secrecy con-
straints only. However, different portions of the s.d.o.f. region
of the interference channel are governed by different upper
bounds. To see this, we can study the structure of the extreme
points of D, since D is the convex hull of them. The sum
s.d.o.f. tuple, which is symmetric and has no zero elements,
is governed by the upper bounds in (67) due to secrecy
constraints. However, as shown in [53], all other extreme
points have zeros as some elements, and therefore are governed
by the upper bounds in (68) due to interference constraints in
[66], [67]. An explanation can be provided as follows: When
some transmitters do not have messages to transmit, we may
employ them as “helpers”. Even though secrecy constraint is
considered in our problem, with the help of the “helpers”, the
effect due to the existence of the eavesdropper in the network
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Secure d.o.f. region of two−user MAC wiretap channel
 
 
 ←  (1/3, 1/3)
Secure d.o.f. region
Sum secure d.o.f. bound
d.o.f. region
Fig. 8. The s.d.o.f. region of the K = 2-user multiple access wiretap channel.
can be eliminated. Hence, this portion of the s.d.o.f. region is
dominated by the interference constraints.
Here, as concrete examples, we provide the s.d.o.f. regions
for the multiple access wiretap channel and the interference
channel with secrecy constraints when K = 2, 3, 4, to show
intricate differences. The detailed proofs and the structures of
the extreme points for all K can be found in [53].
For K = 2, the s.d.o.f. region of the multiple access wiretap
channel in Theorem 4 becomes
D =
{
d : 2d1 + d2 ≤ 1,
d1 + 2d2 ≤ 1,
d1, d2 ≥ 0
}
(72)
and is shown in Fig. 8. The extreme points of this region
are: (0, 0), (12 , 0), (0,
1
2 ), and (
1
3 ,
1
3 ). In order to provide the
achievability of the region, it suffices to provide the achiev-
ability of these extreme points. In fact, the achievabilities of
(12 , 0), (0,
1
2 ) were proved in [46], [48] in the helper setting
and the achievability of (13 ,
1
3 ) was proved in [47], [48]. Note
that (13 ,
1
3 ) is the only sum s.d.o.f. optimum point.
For K = 3, the s.d.o.f. region of the multiple access wiretap
channel in Theorem 4 becomes
D =
{
d : 3d1 + 2d2 + 2d3 ≤ 2,
2d1 + 3d2 + 2d3 ≤ 2,
2d1 + 2d2 + 3d3 ≤ 2,
d1, d2, d3 ≥ 0
}
(73)
and is shown in Fig. 9. The extreme points of this region are:(
0, 0, 0
)
(
2
3
, 0, 0
)
,
(
0,
2
3
, 0
)
,
(
0, 0,
2
3
)
(
2
5
,
2
5
, 0
)
,
(
2
5
, 0,
2
5
)
,
(
0,
2
5
,
2
5
)
(
2
7
,
2
7
,
2
7
)
(74)
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Fig. 9. The s.d.o.f. region of the K = 3-user multiple access wiretap channel.
which correspond to the maximum individual s.d.o.f. (see
Gaussian wiretap channel with two helpers [46], [48]), the
maximum sum of pair of s.d.o.f. (see two-user Gaussian
multiple access wiretap channel with one helper, proved in
[53]), and the maximum sum s.d.o.f. (see three-user Gaussian
multiple access wiretap channel [47], [48]). Note that (27 , 27 , 27 )
is the only sum s.d.o.f. optimum point.
For K = 2, the s.d.o.f. region of the interference channel
with secrecy constraints in Theorem 5 becomes
D =
{
d : 2d1 + d2 ≤ 1,
d1 + 2d2 ≤ 1,
d1, d2 ≥ 0
}
(75)
which is the same as (72), and is shown in Fig. 8. Note that
(68) is not necessary for the two-user case, since summing the
bounds 2d1+ d2 ≤ 1 and d1+2d2 ≤ 1 up gives a new bound
d1 + d2 ≤
2
3
(76)
which is the result in Theorem 3 and makes the constraint
in (68) strictly loose. In order to provide the achievability, it
suffices to check that the extreme points (0, 0), (12 , 0), (0,
1
2 ),
and (13 ,
1
3 ) are achievable. In fact, the achievabilities of
(12 , 0), (0,
1
2 ) are similar to [46], [48] and shown in [53]. The
achievability of (13 ,
1
3 ) was proved in [49], [50]. Note that
(13 ,
1
3 ) is the only sum s.d.o.f. optimum point.
For K = 3, the s.d.o.f. region of the interference channel
with secrecy constraints in Theorem 5 becomes
D =
{
d : 3d1 + d2 + d3 ≤ 2,
d1 + 3d2 + d3 ≤ 2,
d1 + d2 + 3d3 ≤ 2,
d1, d2, d3 ≥ 0
}
(77)
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Fig. 10. The s.d.o.f. region of the K = 3-user interference channel.
which is shown in Fig. 10. Inequality in (68) is not necessary
for the three-user case, either. This is because, due to the pos-
itiveness of each element in d, from the first two inequalities
in (77), we have
3d1 + d2 ≤ 3d1 + d2 + d3 ≤ 2 (78)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ d1 + 3d2 + d3 ≤ 2 (79)
Summing the left hand sides up of (78) and (79) gives us
d1 + d2 ≤ 1 (80)
which is (68) with V = {1, 2}, and we have (68) for free from
(77). The extreme points of this region are:(
0, 0, 0
)
(
2
3
, 0, 0
)
,
(
0,
2
3
, 0
)
,
(
0, 0,
2
3
)
(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0
)
,
(
1
2
, 0,
1
2
)
,
(
0,
1
2
,
1
2
)
(
2
5
,
2
5
,
2
5
)
(81)
which correspond to the maximum individual s.d.o.f. (see
Gaussian wiretap channel with two helpers [46], [48]), the
maximum sum of pair of s.d.o.f. (proved in [53]), and the
maximum sum s.d.o.f. (see three-user Gaussian IC-CM-EE in
[49], [50]). Note that, (12 , 12 ) is the maximum sum d.o.f. for a
two-user IC without secrecy constraints, and (25 ,
2
5 ,
2
5 ) is the
only sum s.d.o.f. optimum point. Finally, note the difference
of the extreme points of the 3-user interference channel in (81)
from the corresponding 3-user multiple access wiretap channel
in (74), even though the s.d.o.f. regions and the extreme points
of the 2-user interference channel and 2-user multiple access
wiretap channel in (75) and (72) were the same.
For K = 4, the s.d.o.f. region of the interference channel
with secrecy constraints in Theorem 5 becomes
D =
{
d : 4d1 + d2 + d3 + d4 ≤ 3,
d1 + 4d2 + d3 + d4 ≤ 3,
d1 + d2 + 4d3 + d4 ≤ 3,
d1 + d2 + d3 + 4d4 ≤ 3,
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d1 + d2 ≤ 1,
d1 + d3 ≤ 1,
d1 + d4 ≤ 1,
d2 + d3 ≤ 1,
d2 + d4 ≤ 1,
d3 + d4 ≤ 1,
d1, d2, d3, d4 ≥ 0
}
(82)
The extreme points of this region are:(
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)
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)
,
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3
4
, 0, 0
)
,
(
0, 0,
3
4
, 0
)
,
(
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4
)
(
2
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0
)
up to element reordering(
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,
1
2
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)
,
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1
2
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1
2
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1
2
)
,
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2
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2
)
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1
2
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3
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,
3
7
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3
7
)
(83)
Here, in contrast to the two-user and three-user cases, (68)
is absolutely necessary. For example, the point (35 ,
3
5 , 0, 0)
satisfies (67), but not (68). In fact, it cannot be achieved, and
(68) is strictly needed to enforce that fact.
VII. HELPER NETWORK WITH NO EAVESDROPPER CSI:
BLIND COOPERATIVE JAMMING
In this section, we consider the case where the legitimate
transmitters do not have CSI of the channels to the eavesdrop-
per. We present one more technical tool, blind cooperative
jamming, which will be used to prove that, even in the case
of no eavesdropper CSI at the transmitters, the s.d.o.f. of the
Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers is still M
M+1 , as in
the case of full eavesdropper CSI in Section III.
Theorem 8 ([54]) The s.d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap chan-
nel with M helpers but no eavesdropper CSI at the transmit-
ters is M
M+1 for almost all channel gains.
The converse for this result follows from the converse for the
case of full CSI, as the s.d.o.f. with full CSI is an upper bound
for the s.d.o.f. without eavesdropper CSI.
When there is no eavesdropper CSI at the transmitters,
the cooperative jamming signals cannot be aligned with the
message carrying signals at the eavesdropper to protect them
as in Fig. 5. In this case, the insight of blind cooperative
jamming is that all of the M + 1 transmitters send a large
number of cooperative jamming signals, which get distributed
to sufficiently many dimensions at the eavesdropper’s obser-
vation space, exceeding its maximum decoding capability and
protecting the message carrying signals; see Fig. 11. Then, the
information leakage to the eavesdropper can be upper bounded
by a function which vanishes as the transmit power P becomes
large, using a method different than in Section III. In addition,
the CSI of the channels to the legitimate receiver is used to
align all of the M + 1 cooperative jamming signals in the
smallest possible dimension at the legitimate receiver.
Let {V2, V3, · · · , VM+1, U1, U2, U3, · · · , UM+1} be mutu-
ally independent discrete random variables, each of which
uniformly drawn from the same PAM constellation C(a,Q) in
(10). We choose the input signal of the legitimate transmitter
as
X1 =
1
h1
U1 +
M+1∑
k=2
αkVk (84)
where {αk}M+1k=2 are rationally independent and independent
of all channel gains. The input signal of the jth helper, j =
2, · · · ,M + 1, is chosen as
Xj =
1
hj
Uj (85)
Then, the observations of the receivers are
Y1 =
M+1∑
k=2
h1αkVk +

M+1∑
j=1
Uj

+N1 (86)
Y2 =
M+1∑
k=2
g1αkVk +
M+1∑
j=1
gj
hj
Uj +N2 (87)
where the signals in square parentheses in (86) are aligned at
the legitimate receiver.
The intuition here is as follows: We use M independent
sub-signals Vk, k = 2, · · · ,M + 1, to represent the origi-
nal message W . The input signal X1 is a linear combina-
tion of Vks and a cooperative jamming signal U1. At the
legitimate receiver, all of the cooperative jamming signals
Uks are well-aligned such that they occupy a small por-
tion of the signal space. Since {1, h1α2, h1α3, · · · , h1αM+1}
are rationally independent with probability one, the signals{
V2, V3, · · · , VM+1,
∑M+1
j=1 Uj
}
can be distinguished by the
legitimate receiver. Due to the fact that the eavesdropper’s CSI
is not available at the transmitters, the alignment-based achiev-
able scheme in Section III does not work for this model. How-
ever, we observe that the coefficients
{
g1
h1
, · · · , gM+1
hM+1
}
are
rationally independent, and therefore, {U1, U2, · · · , UM+1}
span the entire space at the eavesdropper; see Fig. 11. Here, by
entire space, we mean the maximum number of dimensions
eavesdropper is capable to decode, which is M + 1 in this
case. Since the entire space at the eavesdropper is occupied
by the cooperative jamming signals, the message signals
{V2, V3, · · · , VM+1} are protected.
We note that, while only the helpers sent cooperative
jamming signals in the case of full eavesdropper CSI in Sec-
tion III, here the legitimate transmitter also sends a cooperative
jamming signal. These M + 1 cooperative jamming signals
are needed to protect M message carrying signals at the
eavesdropper, i.e., the lack of CSI of the eavesdropper is com-
pensated by increasing the number of cooperative jamming
signals with respect to the number of message carrying signals.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this review paper, we revisited the sum s.d.o.f. and
s.d.o.f. regions of several one-hop wireless networks with
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Fig. 11. Illustration of the alignment scheme based on blind cooperative jamming for Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers (eavesdropper’s CSI is not
available at the transmitters).
secrecy constraints: Gaussian wiretap channel with helpers,
Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel, and Gaussian in-
terference channel with secrecy constraints. We first reviewed
two key lemmas required for converse proofs. The secrecy
penalty lemma showed that the net effect of an eavesdropper
on the system is that it eliminates one of the independent
channel inputs. The role of a helper lemma developed a
direct relationship between the cooperative jamming signal of
a helper and the message rate. We showed how to apply these
two lemmas in the helper network in depth, and also in the IC-
EE network briefly. We presented achievable schemes based on
(asymptotic) real interference alignment, cooperative jamming,
structured signalling, and also blind cooperative jamming in
the case of no CSI at the transmitters in the helper network.
We also reviewed the polytope structure of the s.d.o.f. converse
regions, identified the extreme points, and then showed the
achievability for each of the extreme points.
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